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EXHIBITS LIST

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT:
The Appellant did not request the Reporter's transcript from December 7, 2011. This transcript will
not be filed with the Supreme Court.
Reporter's Transcript taken February 27, 2017, will be lodged with the Supreme Court.

Claimant's Exhibits:
1.

Vocational evaluation records from Doug Crum, CDMS, dated November 18, 2009

2.

Vocational evaluation records from Doug Crum, CDMS, dated April 7, 2016

3.

Pictures of Bryan Oliveros' right extremity and hand

4.

Milan Institute Emollment Agreement, Page 1

5.

Milan Institute Financial Aid Information Estimate

6.

Milan Institute AR Student Ledger

7.

Milan Institute Student Transcript

8.

Milan Institute Certificate of Completion

9.

Screen Shot of Bryan Oliveros' Idaho State Board of Pharmacy Active License

10.

Deposition of Bryan Oliveros, dated January 24, 2017

11.

Calculation of Total Temporary Benefits during retraining

12.

Summary of Requests for authorization and Reimbursement for Retraining

13.

Pinnacle Risk Management claims file (to be supplied by Defendant)

14.

Douglas N. Crum, CDMS, CV

15.

Notice of service (Labeled Exhibit 15)
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16.

Interrogatories and Requests for Production to Defendants

la.

Vocational evaluation records from Doug Crum, CDMS, dated November 18, 2009

2a.

Pertinent correspondence from May 2009- November 2011

Defendants' Exhibits:
1.

Form 1

2.

Medical records from Canyon County Paramedics

3.

Medical records from St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center

4.

Medical records of Dominic Gross, M.D. / Katherine Laible, PA-C .

5.

Medical records from St. Luke's Idaho Elks Rehab

6.

Medical records of Beth Rogers, M.D.

7.

Medical records of Michael McClay, PH.D.

8.

Advanced Arm Dynamics report of April 1, 2011

9.

Industrial Commission Rehabilitation Division Records

10.

Transcript of Claimant's deposition taken September 1, 2011

la.

Transcript of Claimant's deposition taken July 5, 2013

2a.

Transcript of Claimant's deposition taken January 24, 2017

Depositions:
1.

Deposition of MacJulian Lang, taken December 15, 2011

2.

Deposition of Dominic Gross, M.D., taken February 22, 2012

3.

Deposition of Bryan Oliveros, taken September 1, 2011
See Defendant's Exhibit 10
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11.

Transcript of Claimant's deposition taken July 5, 2013
See Defendants' Exhibit 1a

12.

Deposition of Bryan Oliveros, dated January 24, 2017
See Claimant's Exhibit 10 and Defendants' Exhibit 2a

Additional Documents:
1.

Claimant's Opening Brief, filed August 7, 2012

2.

Defendant's Post-Hearing Brief, filed August 29, 2012

3.

Claimant's Reply Brief, filed September 12, 2012

4.

Claimant's Opening Post-Hearing Memorandum, filed April 24, 2017

5.

Defendants' Post-Hearing Brief, filed May 17, 2017

5.

Claimant's Post-Hearing Reply Memorandum, filed June 5, 2017

6.

Memorandum in Support of Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration, filed September 14,
2017

7.

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Response to Claimant's Motion for
Reconsideration and in Support of Defendants' Objection to Claimant's Motion for
Extension of Time to file a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration, filed September 21, 2017

8.

Reply Memorandum in Support of Claimant's Motion for reconsideration, filed October 18,
2017
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BRYAN OLIVEROS,
Claimant,

IC 2008-024772

V.

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND RECOMMENDATION

RULE STEEL TANKS, INC.,
Employer,
and
ADVANTAGE WORKERS
COMPENSATION INSURANCE CO.,

FI LED

AUG 2 5 2017
Surety,

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the aboveentitled matter to Referee Brian Harper, who conducted a hearing in Boise, Idaho,
on February 22, 2017. 1 W. Breck Seiniger of Boise represented Claimant. R. Daniel Bowen
of Boise represented Defendants.

The parties submitted oral and documentary evidence

at hearing and submitted post-hearing briefs.

No post-hearing depositions were taken.

The matter came under advisement on June 6, 2017.

1

This is the second hearing in this matter. The first was held by Referee Just on December 7, 2011, and dealt
with the limited issue of whether Claimant was entitled to a certain prosthetic appliance for his right hand
finger amputations. The findings from that hearing, published in November 2012, are discussed herein
to the extent necessary, and incorporated by reference as if set forth in whole.
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/'16

ISSUES
The issues to be decided are:
1.

Whether

and

to

what

extent

Claimant

1s

entitled

to

retraining

reimbursement benefits;
2.

Whether Claimant 1s entitled to temporary disability benefits while m

the period of retraining;
3.

Whether and to what extent Claimant is entitled to disability benefits; and

4.

Whether Claimant is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to

Idaho Code § 72-804.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Claimant asserts that he suffered a 75% permanent partial disability as a result of his
subject industrial injury, without factoring in mitigation of such disability resulting from
Claimant's self-financed "retraining"

2

as a pharmacy tech.

If Claimant's post-high school

training and education are considered, his disability is reduced to 55% permanent
partial disability.

Because Claimant's post secondary education was a significant factor

in reducing his permanent disability from 75% to 55%, Defendants should be required to pay for
52 weeks of such "retraining" in addition to benefits for Claimant's permanent partial
disability of 55%. Since Claimant did not work while "retraining" he is entitled to 52 weeks
of TTD benefits. If Defendants are not obligated to pay for Claimant's "retraining" they should
be required to pay permanent partial disability benefits for Claimant's permanent disability

2

The Referee, but not the Claimant, uses quotation marks around the word retraining, since the undersigned cannot
legitimately call Claimant's post-secondary education retraining. Retraining implies Claimant was previously
trained in some career, and had to be retrained, i.e. trained again, due to the accident in question. Technically, while
Claimant obtained work-skill training post-accident, he did not receive retraining in the popular sense of the word.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 2

as of the date ofMMI, to wit, at the rate of 75% PPD.
Defendants argue that Claimant, who suffered his mJury while still in high school,
is not entitled to retroactive reimbursement of his post-secondary education and training
under the guise of retraining benefits.

To his credit, Claimant "thrived" after his

industrial accident, acquiring skills, training, and education which allowed him to obtain
gainful employment.
person impairment.

He suffered no permanent disability in excess of his 32% whole
Claimant is not entitled to retraining, TTD, and/or PPD benefits.

Defendants are not liable for attorney fees.
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED

The record in this matter consists of the following:
1.

The testimony of Claimant and Douglas Crum taken at hearing;

2.

Claimant's exhibits 1 through 10, 12, and 14 through 16 admitted at hearing;3

3.

Defendants' exhibits 1 and 2, admitted at hearing;

4.

The Industrial Commission file and record m this matter, including

the exhibits admitted at the first hearing.
FINDINGS OF FACT

RELEVANT PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED FINDINGS
As footnoted above, Referee Just conducted a prev10us hearing m this matter,
and Findings

of Fact

and

Conclusions

of Law

flowed

therefrom.

Those

facts

and legal conclusions are binding, and serve as a framework herein. While all such facts and
legal conclusions are incorporated herein by reference, certain facts and conclusions

3

Claimant's Exhibit 11 was withdrawn at hearing; 13 was not admitted due a sustained objection to its admission,
and Exhibits 14, 15, and 16 were offered and admitted during the course of the hearing.
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are reiterated, summarized, and/or paraphrased herein to provide clarity.

Additional facts

from the 2017 proceedings are also included as required to support the conclusions.
1.

At the time of the 2011 hearing, Claimant was twenty-one years of age.

2.

At the time of his industrial accident, July 30, 2008, Claimant had not yet

graduated from high school. In addition to his high school studies, Claimant worked part-time
in a fast-food restaurant, earning between $7.00 and $7.50 per hour.
3.

During his summer vacation in 2008, Claimant started a temporary summer job

at Rule Steel Tanks, Inc., where his father also worked. His rate of pay was $7.00 per hour.
Claimant's job was operating a metal press that shaped pieces of steel.

On Claimant's

second day of work, he caught the fingers of his dominant right hand in the metal press,
resulting in a traumatic amputation of portions of all four fingers on his dominant hand,
associated crush injuries, and some degloving injuries on what remained of his fingers.
4.

Claimant's severed fingertips were not replantable because of significant

soft tissue and bone damage in the residual fingers.
5.

Following several surgeries, Claimant emerged with a right hand that includes

an uninjured thumb, and portions of each of his four fingers. 4
6.

By April 6, 2009, Claimant was medically stable.

Claimant received

an impairment rating of 32% whole person, with permanent restrictions related to the use
of his right hand.

4

For a finger-by-finger description of the Joss, see the November 12, 2012 Findings of Fact.
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POST-2011 FINDINGS
7.

Claimant obtained a GED in 2009, after missing too much school due to his injury

to graduate with his classmates.

From there, Claimant attended Lewis-Clark State College

in Lewiston for an academic year.

He then attended College of Western Idaho (online)

briefly in the summer of 2010. He dropped his class at CWI after about three weeks.
8.

Claimant, both before and briefly after the accident in question worked part time

at a local Dairy Queen, but beginning in the summer of 2011 he gained employment at WDS,
which was a Verizon call center. He worked there through that November. His job duties
included assisting customers with billing issues. He used a computer and phone set extensively.
Claimant became unemployed in December 2011. Thereafter, he unsuccessfully sought work
at numerous banks for a teller position, at call centers, and for jobs operating machines.
9.

Claimant discussed a career as a pharmacy technician (PT) with relatives

· and concluded he should pursue that option.

He began a course of study leading to a PT

certificate at Carrington College in the fall semester of 2012.

Soon after enrolling there,

he discovered he could obtain his PT certificate from the Milan Institute for less money,
and the Institute was much closer to his home. Claimant quit Carrington College and enrolled
at Milan Institute to complete his ten-month training course.
10.

Claimant's PT program required him to complete a one-month unpaid

pharmacy internship, which he accomplished in May 2013, and received his PT certificate
thereafter. Claimant financed his PT education with a grant, student loans, and financial help
from his parents.
11.

Claimant was not employed or working for mcome during the time he

was undergoing his PT training.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 5

12.

About two months after obtaining his PT certificate, Claimant found work at

Terry Reilly Pharmacy in Nampa as a PT.

His starting salary was $11.80 per hour,5

with paid medical, vision, and dental benefits after two months.

Claimant worked for

Terry Reilly Pharmacy for two years.
13.

Next, Claimant went to work for TigerDirect doing telephone sales. That job paid

$14.50 per hour. Claimant went into this employment knowing it would not be his career job.
TigerDirect was bought out, and Claimant lost his job there.
14.

After applying at numerous pharmacies and banks, Claimant found a job working

as a teller at KeyBank. He worked there from February 2016 through September of that year.
His rate of pay was $11.50 per hour.

He was released after a customer filed a complaint

against him.
15.

In December 2016, Claimant found employment with Albertsons Pharmacy's

corporate offices in Boise. He works as a third-party coordinator, whereby he processes claims
for pharmacies when there are issues at the point of purchase.

Claimant continued to be

employed in this position at the time of hearing. His hourly wage is $15.87 plus health, dental,
vision, and 401(k) benefits after three months. Claimant enjoys working there and plans on
staying with Albertsons long term if possible. After one year of employment, there are multiple
opportunities for advancement with the company.
16.

Claimant's job at Albertsons requires a pharmacy tech license (which Claimant

possesses), and call center experience is desired, as is prior experience working with insurance
companies and Medicare/Medicaid. Claimant had experience in all these categories when hired.

5

At hearing, Claimant indicated he started at $12.80, but at his 2013 deposition (DE 1), taken a month after starting
employment at Terry Reilly, Claimant testified he was making $11.80. The Referee finds Claimant's 2013
testimony is more accurate as to his starting salary.
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DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS
In this proceeding, Claimant asks the Commission to order Defendants to reimburse him
for a portion of his post-secondary education, which he deems to be "retraining." He also seeks
benefits for his permanent partial disability. The twist presented herein is Claimant's argument
that if Defendants are not obligated to pay for his training, then Claimant's disability should be
analyzed as of the date Claimant reached MMI, with no consideration of his subsequent training
and experience. Claimant acknowledges that by the time of hearing his disability rating was
reduced due to his post-secondary education, training, and experience.

However, Claimant

argues that since Defendants did not pay for such education, they should not get the benefit of
Claimant showing initiative and bettering his employment situation after his accident.

RETRAINING AND ASSOC/A TED TTD BENEFITS
17.

Idaho Code § 72-450 provides, in pertinent part:
... [I]f the commission deems a permanently disabled employee, after the
period of recovery, is receptive to and in need of retraining in another field,
skill or vocation in order to restore his earning capacity, the commission
may authorize or order such retraining and during the period of retraining or
any extension thereof, the employer shall continue to pay the disabled
employee, as a subsistence benefit, temporary total or temporary partial
disability benefits as the case my be. The period of retraining shall be fixed
by the commission but shall not exceed fifty-two (52) weeks unless the
commission, following application and hearing, deems it advisable to extend
the period of retraining, in which case the increased period shall not exceed
fifty-two (52) weeks.

18.

Breaking Idaho Code § 72-450 into its component parts, the following are points

to be considered:
(1)

The Commission has discretion (but not a statutory obligation) to authorize or

order retraining benefits when;
(A)

Claimant is permanently disabled after reaching MMI, and

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 7

;Jo/

(2)

(B)

Claimant is receptive to retraining into a different field, skill, or
vocation than the Claimant previously held, and

(C)

The retraining
earning capacity.

1s

designed

to

restore

Claimant's

When retraining is authorized or ordered, the retraining benefits will not exceed

52 weeks, unless after hearing the Commission deems it advisable to extend the period
of retraining for up to an additional 52 weeks.
19.

Applying the technical phrasing of Idaho Code § 72-450 to the instant case,

it appears Claimant does not meet all the criteria for application of the statute. While Claimant
is undeniably permanently disabled, well beyond his date of medical stability, and was
receptive to training, the remainder of the statute is less clear.
20.

For starters, Claimant did not have an established "field, skill, or vocation"

at the time of his accident from which he was thereafter precluded due to his injuries. Arguably,
Claimant's time-of-injury skills centered on working for fast food establishments while going
to school. After the accident, he returned to the fast food industry, at least temporarily. Thus
he proved he could still pursue those skills required to work at a fast food restaurant. His oneplus day's experience at Rule Steel did not imbue Claimant with skills, was not his chosen field,
and was never considered by him to be a place where he intended to pursue his vocation.
Instead, both pre- and post-accident, Claimant had aspirations to attend college after high school.
Claimant's fulfilled desire of attending institutions of higher learning after high school hardly fits
the

common
21.

definition

of "retraining

into

a different

field,

skill,

or

vocation."

The next issue confronting Claimant as regards the language of the statute

in question is the fact that he did not need retraining in order to restore his previous
earning capacity. At the time of his accident, Claimant had a minimum wage earning capacity.
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Had he not been injured, there is no proof Claimant, without further education, would have likely
started his post-high school career at anything other than a low to minimum wage job.
While his further education certainly enhanced his earning ability, Claimant's earning capacity
was not seriously undermined by his industrial accident, as admitted by Claimant's
vocational rehabilitation expert.
22.

Juxtaposed against the technical reading of Idaho Code § 72-450, with its

prerequisites and limitations, is the time-honored axiom that "[t]he provisions of the Idaho
Workers' Compensation Law are to be liberally construed in favor of the employee."

Haldimanv. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 956, 793 P.2d 187, 188 (1990).
"The humane purposes which it serves leave no room for narrow, technical construction."

Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996). While this language is often
thrown into opinions without any real purpose or application to the particular facts in question,
in this case a chief issue to be decided rests upon the application of this concept.
23.

There are several arguments in favor of allowing reimbursement of some of

Claimant's post-high school education, even though his situation clearly does not align with
the four comers of the statutory language. The objective of the statute seems to include giving
an injured worker an opportunity to re-enter the workforce when the only thing preventing reentry is the worker's lack of training in a skill the worker can perform even with whatever
permanent disabilities prevent him or her from returning to their time-of-injury employment.
24.

In the present case, Claimant was at a cross roads when confronted with his post-

injury permanent disability and no real work skills. He could have lamented his condition,
maximized his perceived disabilities and focused on what he could not do. Conversely, Claimant
could have resolved to not let his injury define him.

Faced with these alternatives,
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Claimant chose to discover his capabilities, adapt to his situation, further his education,
and strive to make a life for himself and his new family.

In the process, he incurred

substantial educational expenses.
25.

Defendants concede that Claimant overcame his obstacles, gained a useful

education, obtained work, and started what hopefully will be a successful career. However,
they argue that Claimant did exactly what he wanted to do even before his accident - get college
training and transition that education into a career. Defendants should not be required to pay for
Claimant's education when it was not pursued as an alternative to what he would have done but
for his injuries. Defendants' obligation is defined statutorily, not charitably or equitably.
26.

While both positions on this issue have merit, and while the liberal construction

of the Act should not automatically preclude reimbursement of training expenses in this
unique situation, nevertheless it appears Claimant's post-secondary education was not directed
by his injury. Claimant had a vision of continuing his education after high school even before
his accident.

There is nothing in the record to establish that "but for" the accident,

Claimant would have chosen a different path after high school. To his credit, Claimant did not
abandon his pre-accident goals because of his permanent disability, but rather found a way to
achieve them in spite of his disability. Unfortunately, within the parameters of the Act, there is
no provision for rewarding individuals like Claimant who pull themselves up after a lifechanging accident. To require Defendants to pay for schooling that was part of Claimant's preinjury planning even without the accident is not proper.
27.

Claimant has failed to prove he is entitled to retraining benefits for his post-

secondary education.
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28.

Since Claimant is not entitled to benefits under Idaho Code § 72-450, he is also

not entitled to temporary disability benefits as contemplated by the statute for the time
he attended college.

PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY (PPD)
29.

Permanent disability results when the actual or presumed ability to engage in

gainful activity is reduced or absent because of permanent impairment and no fundamental
or marked change in the future can be reasonably expected. Idaho Code § 72-423.
Evaluation (rating) of permanent disability is an appraisal of the injured employee's
present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is affected by
the medical factor of impairment and by pertinent nonmedical factors provided in
Idaho Code § 72-430. Idaho Code § 72-425. Idaho Code § 72-430(1) provides that
in determining percentages of permanent disabilities, account should be taken of the nature
of the physical disablement, the disfigurement if of a kind likely to handicap the employee
in procuring or holding employment, the cumulative effect of multiple mJunes,
the occupation of the employee, and his or her age at the time of the accident
causing the injury, consideration being given to the diminished ability of the affected
employee to compete in an open labor market within a reasonable geographical area
considering all the personal and economic circumstances of the employee, and other factors
as the Commission may deem relevant.

The test for determining whether Claimant

has suffered a permanent disability greater than permanent impairment 1s "whether
the physical impairment, taken in conjunction with nonmedical factors, has reduced
[the claimant's] capacity for gainful employment."

Graybill v. Swift & Company,
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115 Idaho 293, 294, 766 P.2d 763, 764 (1988). Claimant bears the burden of establishing
his claim for permanent disability benefits.
30.

Claimant hired Douglas Crum, a local vocational rehabilitation consultant,

to conduct a vocational assessment and render an opinion as to Claimant's permanent disability
in light of his medical and non-medical factors.

He prepared two reports and gave live

hearing testimony.
31.

In his first report, dated November 16, 2009, Mr. Crum noted that before

the accident Claimant was in very good health with no pre-existing physical limitations.
Claimant was capable of performing medium and heavy physical-demand jobs. The limitations
placed on Claimant post-accident eliminated his ability to perform heavy physical-demand jobs.
32.

Mr. Crum felt that Claimant, pre-injury, had access to 7.3% of the jobs in his

labor market of Ada and Canyon counties. Mr. Crum opined that post-accident, and without
training, Claimant had access to only 1.4% of the jobs in his labor market.
33.

Regarding wage loss, Mr. Crum felt that although Claimant had a history

of minimum wage work, it would not be fair to use that as his wage baseline, since those jobs
were temporary and/or summer work.

But for the accident, Claimant would have had

the capacity to eventually earn significantly more than minimum wage. However, Mr. Crum felt
that without additional education, post-accident, Claimant would be relegated to low to minimum
wage jobs indefinitely. Mr. Crum cited to statistics from Minnesota State Department of Health
which concluded that disabled individuals were three times more likely to live below the poverty
line than non-disabled individuals, earn nearly 23% less, and were more than twice as likely to
be unemployed. Given these statistics, Mr. Crum felt it was imperative for Claimant to obtain
further education beyond high school.
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34.

Mr. Crum believed that Claimant was unable to perform not only his time-of-

injury job, but also "most other jobs he could reasonably perform" before his injury. CE 1, p. 7.
As such, Mr. Crum assigned Claimant an 80% loss of labor market rating. Mr. Crum did not
assign Claimant a significant wage loss component.
35.

Mr. Crum concluded that without "retraining" Claimant would experience PPD

in the range of 75% inclusive of his 32% PPL
36.

Mr. Crum prepared a second report on April 7, 2016. By then Claimant had

undergone a functional capacity evaluation, which placed Claimant in the medium duty category.
He

had

also

completed

his

schooling

at

Milan

Institute,

and

obtained

his

pharmacy tech certificate.
37.

In reviewing Claimant's wage history after high school, Mr. Crum noted

Claimant had held several jobs significantly in excess of minimum wage.
38.

Due to Claimant's additional on-the-job training, and education culminating in

a pharmacy tech certificate, Claimant's then-current market access loss was reduced from
his prior estimate of 80% to 55%.

Given Claimant's significant wage increases since

his high school jobs, Mr. Crum felt that when wages are factored in, Claimant's PPD inclusive
of his impairment, was 45%.
39.

Defendants retained, but did not utilize, a vocational rehabilitation expert.

Instead Defendants rely on the record to support their theory that Claimant has suffered no PPD
in excess of PPL

They note that Claimant was released to his time-of-injury job in 2009,

has since held several jobs which paid more than he was making at the time of his injury,
including jobs at a call center and a bank, for which Claimant had no prior training.
Claimant did what many high school graduates do - continued his education, got several jobs
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which increased his pool of experience and better defined his vocational interests, and taught him
how to interact with people in a business setting and on the phone.

Outside of work,

Claimant returned to his pre-injury activities including soccer, basketball, and working out
at the gym.

He had no trouble obtaining employment over the years since high school.

Summing up Defendants' position, they noted "Claimant has a visible deformity but functional
use of his right hand. He demonstrated the ability to return to the labor market and obtain
and maintain employment. . . .

As such, Claimant has not demonstrated that he suffered

a disability in excess of his impairment." Ds' Brief, p. 16.
40.

Defendants are also critical of Mr. Crum's opinions. They note that he inflated

Claimant's potential job market by including jobs for which Claimant had never expressed
an interest or aptitude in pursuing, and also by including skilled labor positions such as
carpentry, or welding; jobs for which Claimant had no background, training, or interest.
They note that even without his injury, those skilled labor positions were not jobs which
Claimant could perform. Furthermore, Claimant's visible deformation of his right hand has not
kept him from obtaining employment as needed, and any argument that employers would be
reluctant to hire him due to his "problem" hand has been proven inaccurate.
Permanent Partial Disability Analysis
41.

Analysis of PPD in this case must start with a mistaken assertion raised

at multiple points in Claimant's briefing.

He argues that because Mr. Crum's testimony,

including his opinions, are unrebutted and not inherently improbable, they must be taken as true.
Citing to Pierstorff v. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 447, 448, 74 P.2d 171, 175 (1937),
Claimant argues that the undersigned may not "arbitrarily or capriciously disregard the testimony
of a witness unimpeached by any of the modes known to the law, if such testimony does not
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exceed probability." He also notes that "evidence, uncontradicted, must be accepted as true."
Swanson v. State, 114 Idaho 607,609, 759 P. 898,900 (1998).
42.

The undersigned accepts Mr. Crum's factual testimony as true.

However,

expert opinions are not facts, and do not need to be accepted even if uncontradicted.
"The opinion of an expert is not binding on the trial court, and, as long as it does not
act arbitrarily, the trial court may reject expert testimony even when it is uncontradicted."
Miller v. Cal/ear, 140 Idaho 213, 218, 91 P.3d 1117, 1122 (2004). Furthermore, "[t]he opinions
of an expert are not binding upon the trier of fact, but are advisory only." Clark v. Truss,
142 Idaho 404,408, 128 P.3d 941, 945 (2006). Finally, specifically with regard to PPD analysis,
the Commission considers all relevant medical and nonmedical factors and evaluates
the purely advisory opinions of vocational experts. See Eacret v. Clearwater Forest Indus.,
136 Idaho 733, 40 P.3d 91 (2002); Boley v. State, Industrial Special lndem. Fund,
130 Idaho 278, 939 P.2d 854 (1997). (Emphasis added.)
43.

The

next

issue

to

resolve

1s

the

appropriate

time

for

assessing

Claimant's permanent physical disability. Claimant argues it would be patently unfair to allow
Defendants to sit idly by while Claimant, at his own expense, obtained the post-secondary
education he needed to succeed in his employment, thus driving down his PPD rating, only to
swoop in and use that additional education as a sword to slash Claimant's PPD benefits.
Claimant argues that if Defendants are not required to reimburse Claimant for his
"retraining" expenses, they should not get the benefit of relying on his decreased PPD rating
springing therefrom. Since Defendants do not have to reimburse Claimant for his educational
expenses, Claimant asserts the undersigned should evaluate Claimant's PPD at the time of MMI.
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44.

Defendants meet this argument with a shrug. They argue that with or without

the additional schooling, Claimant can not prove PPD in excess of his 32% PPL
45.

The Idaho Supreme Court in Brown v. The Home Depot, 152 Idaho 605,

272 P.3d 577 (2012), held that, as a general rule, Claimant's disability assessment should be
performed as of the date of hearing. Under Idaho Code§ 72-425, a permanent disability rating is
a measure of the injured worker's "present and probable future ability to engage in
gainful activity."

Therefore, the Court reasoned, in order to assess the injured worker's

"present" ability to engage in gainful activity, it necessarily follows that the labor market,
as it exists at the time of hearing, is the labor market which must be considered.
46.

Permanent disability is a measure of present and future ability to engage in

gainful activity. The record divulges no reason why Claimant's present and future ability
to engage in gainful activity would be more accurately measured at any time other than
the date of the hearing. Claimant's "equitable" argument, while enticing, does not advance
the proper analysis considerations. At the time Claimant reached MMI he was still a "work in
progress" with regard to his ability to engage in gainful employment. By his own admission,
he intended, accident or not, to further his education after high school.

It was never

his intention to forgo further education and enter the work force upon high school graduation.
To judge his ability to obtain and hold employment at a point in time when he was not seeking
to

enter the workforce

on a career basis, makes no

legal

sense.

Therefore,

Claimant's disability will be determined as of the hearing date.
47.

Mr.

Crum's

opm10ns

are

of little

advisory

benefit

m

evaluating

Claimant's PPD. To begin with, his reports and live testimony do not provide even a sample
of the job categories which supposedly Claimant is now precluded from obtaining
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due to his injury. Mr. Crum testified he did not consider jobs such as medical doctors and
lawyers when calculating Claimant's loss of potential jobs, but his reports do not list
the categories of jobs included.

While there was argument that skilled labor jobs

were included, it is not self-evident where this information may be found. Such information
is not contained in Mr. Crum's reports or in his testimony.
48.

Apart from being conclusory in nature, history has shown Mr. Crum's first report

to be incorrect.

The implication of the Minnesota study was that Claimant would have

a difficult time finding employment, making more than minimum wage, and escaping poverty.
In reality, he has always been able to find a job within a reasonable time, found employment
for jobs greater than minimum wage, and now has a job with Albertsons which is very much
a career opportunity.

Even before any additional education, Claimant returned to working

at fast food jobs (which Mr. Crum's report indicated Claimant would have difficulty doing),
and got a job at a call center.

Mr. Crum's assertion that Claimant's hand injury will

"severely impact his vocational options for the rest of his life" appears to be vastly overstated,
thanks to Claimant's drive, desire, adaptability, and perseverance.
49.

While Mr. Crum lists many of Claimant's assets in his report, he fails to highlight

those assets when preparing his analysis. Claimant is fluent in Spanish and English, both spoken
and written, is good at math, and has significant skills with basic computer programs used
in business, including spreadsheets, Photoshop, and Word. He took advanced computer classes
in high school including business applications and principles of marketing. He has a strong
interest in business, and enjoyed his business classes.
to employment, nor a criminal record.

He has no prior impediments

Claimant continues to pursue the hobbies he enjoys,

and is willing to try new business opportunities, even if he is not sure he will be able to succeed.
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50.

Claimant has no desire to do heavy manual labor, and apparently never did.

He consistently projected his future as one which included higher education and a job
in business, not heavy labor and/or construction. Through his education, he has been able to
escape many of the same jobs his injury precluded him from doing.
51.

Certainly Claimant lost the ability to do any job which exceeds his lifting, pulling,

and carrymg limitations imposed in 2009, including those jobs in a heavy category or
which require frequent fine grasping with the right hand. No one is arguing that Claimant has
no permanent disability.

The issue is whether his disability exceeds his 32% whole person

impairment rating.
52.

Within the job categories Claimant has expressed an interest in, few lost

opportunities come to mind.

Claimant has shown a strong desire to adapt, and succeed.

As noted at hearing, he would have difficulty putting tiny screws into tiny holes with his
right hand.

Other similar jobs requiring fine manipulation with his right hand would be

precluded, as would jobs which require over 20 pounds lifting, 5 pound gripping and carrying
with his right hand, pushing and pulling more than 75 and 50 pounds, respectively.
See CE 2, p. 10. Those restrictions leave a plethora of jobs available to Claimant, given his

motivation to work.
53.

Applying the listed factors in Idaho Code § 72-430, Claimant clearly incurred

a graphic permanent physically-noticeable injury which will impact his ability to obtain or hold
certain employment opportunities. On the other hand, he has no pre-existing limiting conditions
which hinder his ability to work. He has chosen career opportunities which minimize the effect
of his disability, by consistently opting for office work.

Claimant is young, confident,

and willing to learn. He has technology skills -prevalent within his age group. His attitude
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and drive will serve him well in the open labor market. Contrary to Mr. Crum's testimony that
employers do not want to hire "problems" such as Claimant's deformed hand, it appears
many are willing to give Claimant just such an opportunity.
54.

When considering the totality of the evidence, and ignoring for now

Claimant's PPI rating and benefits paid, which will be discussed below, it does not appear
Claimant has suffered a loss of more than 30% of his applicable labor market, and no loss of
earning capacity. Since earning capacity is of minor relevance when compared to loss of job
market, the Referee finds Claimant's non-medical PPD is 25%.
55.

Claimant argues he is entitled to PPD benefits even if they do not exceed

his impairment rating and corresponding benefits paid thereunder, citing as authority
Davis v. Hammack Mgmt.,

161 Idaho 791, 391 P.3d (2017).

While Davis dealt with

the Commission's jurisdiction to enforce a compensation agreement, ruling that the Commission
lacked jurisdiction to approve the proposed stipulation, the latest word specifically on the issue
at hand is Dickinson v. Adams County, 2017 IIC 0007 (March 21, 2017).

Dickinson is

controlling law on this issue.
56.

As explained by Dickinson "permanent impairment," is actually only payable

as a component of disability-less-than-total under Idaho Code § 72-428.

Impairment is not

a separately owed and payable benefit apart from PPD. Disability paid under the heading of
"permanent partial impairment" or PPI is included, and credited against any payment made
under PPD. Sometimes PPD will be larger than PPI, since PPD includes those non-medical
factors that impact Claimant's ability to be gainfully employed, and sometimes it will not.
Here PPD is not greater than the PPI rating previously given. Since Claimant has been paid
"impairment," benefits, which are actually disability benefits, of 32% whole person, a finding of
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25% whole person PPD is subsumed within the 32% whole person benefit previously paid.
Claimant is entitled to the larger of the disability components, which in this case is the PPI
payments previously paid.
57.

Claimant has failed to prove he is entitled to payment of additional benefits

for PPD not in excess of the 32% PPI benefits previously paid under Idaho Code§ 72-428.
ATTORNEY FEES

58.

Attorney fees are not granted to a claimant as a matter of right under the Idaho

Workers' Compensation Law. They may be recovered only under the circumstances set forth
in Idaho Code § 72-804, which provides for an award of attorney fees to a claimant
if the employer or surety contest a claim without reasonable ground, refuses to pay compensation
provided by law, or discontinues payment of benefits without reasonable grounds.
Th~ decision that grounds exist for awarding a claimant attorney fees is a factual determination
that rests with the Commission.

Troutner v. Traffic Control Company, 97 Idaho 525, 528,

547 P.2d 1130, 1133 (1976).
59.

As Claimant failed to carry his burden of proving his entitlement to the benefits

which were the subject of this proceeding, there is no basis for the award of attorney fees.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Claimant has failed to prove he is entitled to reimbursement and corresponding

temporary total disability benefits under Idaho Code§ 72-450;
2.

Claimant has failed to prove he is entitled to additional permanent partial

disability benefits in excess of the 32% whole person impairment benefits previously paid;
3.

Claimant has failed to prove he is entitled to an award of attorney fees

under Idaho Code § 72-804.
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RECOMMENDA TION

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Referee
recommends that the Commission adopt such findings and conclusions as its own and issue
an appropriate final order.
DATED this ;l.7--h day of_-----=J_v..c..-l'I.__ _ _, 2017.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Brian Harper, Referee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the ~5ltuay of ~ , 2017, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing FINDINGS
OF FACT,
C
CLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
RECOMMENDATION was served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following:
W BRECK SEINIGER
942 MYRTLE STREET
BOISE ID 83702

R DANIEL BOWEN
PO BOX 1007
BOISE ID 83701-1007
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BRYAN OLIVEROS,
Claimant,

IC 2008-024772

V.

RULE STEEL TANKS, INC.,

ORDER

Employer,
and

Fl LED

ADV ANTAGE WORKERS
COMPENSATION INSURANCE CO.,

AUG 2 5 2017
IHOOSTRW.~

Surety,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-71 7, Referee Brian Harper submitted the record in the
above-entitled matter, together with his recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law, to
the members of the Idaho Industrial Commission for their review. Each of the undersigned
Commissioners has reviewed the record and the recommendations of the Referee.
Commission concurs with these recommendations.

The

Therefore, the Commission approves,

confirms, and adopts the Referee's proposed findings of fact and conclusions oflaw as its own.
Based upon the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Claimant has failed to prove he is entitled to reimbursement and corresponding

temporary total disability benefits under Idaho Code § 72-450.
2.

Claimant has failed to prove he is entitled to additional permanent partial

disability benefits in excess of the 32% whole person impairment benefits previously paid.

ORDER-1

3.

Claimant has failed to prove he 1s entitled to an award of attorney fees

under Idaho Code § 72-804.
4.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to

all matters adjudicated.
DATED thisae1'aay o f ~ ' 2017.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner

Assis~atl.t Commissiin ~cretary
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

a,.~ ,

I hereby certify that on the ~ day of
2017, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was served by regularU ~d States Mail upon each of the following:
W BRECK SEINIGER
942 MYRTLE STREET
BOISE ID 83702

jsk
ORDER-2

R DANIEL BOWEN
PO BOX 1007
BOISE ID 83701

Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Seiniger Law Offices, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

I.C. No. 08-024772

Bryan Oliveros,

CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Claimant,
vs.
Rule Steel Tanks, Inc., Employer, and Pinnacle
Risk Management, Surety,
Defendants.

Comes now the claimant, by and through his attorney of record, and moves this
Honorable Commission to reconsider its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Recommendation entered in this matter on August 25, 2017. The grounds upon which this
motion is based are set forth in the memorandum filed here with.
September 13, 2017.
/)

,/

i1'1t_'X>t
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr.
Attorney for Claimant

CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
-1-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On September 13, 2017 I served the foregoing by facsimile transmission on:
Dan Bowen
1311 W. Jefferson
P.O. Box 1007
Boise, ID 83701-1007
Fax: (208) 344-9670

.,

,,.--

1/6/~-p;."tJt

,,., L--·

,,___,,-

tJ

wm Breck Seiniger, Jr.
Attorneys for Claimant

CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
-2-

~,,

R. DANIEL BOWEN (ISB #2673)
BOWEN & BAILEY, LLP
1311 W. JEFFERSON ST.
P.O. BOX 1007
BOISE, ID 83701-1007
Telephone: (208) 344-7200
Facsimile: (208) 344-9670
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Attorneys for Defendants

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSON OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BRYAN OLIVEROS,
Claimant,
V.

RULE STEEL TANKS, INC.,
Employer,
and
ADVANTAGE WORKERS
COMPENSATION INSURANCE CO.,
Surety,
Defendants.

______ ______ ___

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

J.C. No.:

2008-024772

RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERA TION
AND OBJECTION TO CLAIMANT'S
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME
TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERA TION

COME NOW Defendants, by and through counsel of record, responding to Claimant's
Motion for Reconsideration, objecting to the same, as is discussed further in Defendants' own
memorandum. Further, Defendants object to Claimant's Motion for Extension of Time to File
Supplemental Memorandum based upon Idaho Code § 72-718 and Industrial Commission Rules

RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND OBJECTION TO
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
1

aao

of Judicial Procedure, Rule G, which state that motions to reconsider shall be made within 20
days of the date of the final decision and shall be supported by a brief filed with the motion,
(emphasis added). The rule does not allow for extensions of time for additional briefing.
DATED this

5f

_di_:_ day of September, 2017.
BOWEN & BAILEY, L.L.P.

R. DANIEL BOWEN - of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of September, 2017, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document was served upon the following party(ies) in the method indicated:
W BRECK SEINIGER ESQ
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES
942 W MYRTLE ST
BOISE ID 83702
FAX: (208) 345-4700

0 U.S.MAIL
0 HAND DELIVER Y
ur'FACSIM ILE

R. Daniel Bowen

RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND OBJECTION TO
CLAIMANT 'S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BRYAN OLIVEROS,
Claimant,

IC 2008-024772

V.

RULE STEEL TANKS, INC.,

ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Employer,
and
ADV ANT AGE WORKERS
COMPENSTATION INSURANCE CO.,
Surety,
Defendants.

Fl LED

JAN O5 2018
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

On or about September 14, 2017, Claimant filed his timely Motion for Reconsideration of
the Commission's August 25, 2017 Order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
authored by Referee Harper. Claimant filed a contemporaneous brief in support of his motion as
required by JRP Rule 3(G). In his supporting brief, Claimant argues that the Commission erred
in declining to award Claimant disability in excess of his 32% PPI rating. First, the Commission
erroneously concluded that because Claimant had designs upon pursuing higher education even
before the work accident, there was insufficient proof that the education he pursued following
the work accident was necessitated by that accident. Further, since the vocational evidence
established that Claimant's post-accident education was responsible for significantly reducing his
disability, it was error for the Commission to decline to award Claimant reimbursement for the
expenses associated with those educational endeavors. Finally, the Commission's finding that
Claimant's post-injury education diminished his disability was inconsistent with the
ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1

Commission's observation that since Claimant was able to work in the fast food industry both
before and after the subject accident this augured against a finding that he suffered accidentproduced disability.
The other major basis for Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration is his assertion that the
Commission erred in not granting Claimant disability in the amount of 25% of the whole person,
over and above the 32% PPI rating previously paid. Per Corgatelli v. Steel West, /nc., 157 Idaho
287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) disability and impairment are separate classes of benefits, and are
therefore separately payable.

In treating impairment as a component of disability, the

Commission denied Claimant the separate awards of impairment and disability envisioned by
Corgatelli and the subsequent case of Davis v. Hammack Management, Inc., 161 Idaho 791, 391
P.3d 1261 (2017).
Defendants responded on September 21, 2017.

Defendants argue that while the

Commission's decision that Claimant is not entitled to payments above and beyond the 32%
impairment rating previously paid as disability is potentially at odds with both Corgatelli and
Davis, it is entirely consistent with Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 160 Idaho 223, 370 P.3d 738
(2016), and the recent Commission decision Dickinson v. Adams County, 2017 IIC 0007 (2017),
discussing the conflicting holdings of Corgatelli and Mayer. As to Claimant's other arguments,
Defendants assert that the Commission did not err in recognizing that Claimant's post-accident
educational activities improved his access to the labor market; the Commission's decision does
not penalize Claimant for advancing his own interests.
Claimant filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718.
Pursuant to that section, the Commission may rehear or reconsider its decision based on the
arguments of the parties.

A motion for reconsideration must be properly supported by a

ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 2

recitation of the factual findings and/or legal conclusions with which the moving party takes
issue. However, the Commission is not ordinarily inclined to re-weigh evidence and arguments
simply because a case was not resolved in the moving party's favor.
In this matter, it was the principal thrust of Claimant's claim that he suffered significant
disability as a consequence of the permanent limitations / restrictions stemming from the July 30,
2008 accident involving his right hand.

Claimant acknowledged that his post-accident

educational and employment-related activities significantly improved his access to the labor
market following the accident.

He argued that Employer should be required to reimburse

Claimant for the expenses associated with his education pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-450, or,
failing that, his disability should be evaluated without taking into consideration the education he
pursued, at his own expense, following the subject accident. In other words, Employer should
not be allowed to avoid reimbursing Claimant for the expenses associated with his education
while, at the same time, enjoying the benefits of Claimant's admirable impetus to pull himself up
by his own boot straps, thus improving his employment opportunities.
The Commission first determined that Claimant did not qualify for retraining benefits
pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-450. In order to qualify for benefits under that section, it must be
demonstrated that the injured worker is "in need of retraining in another field, skill or vocation in
order to restore his earning capacity ... "

As developed in the original decision, this language

implies that at the time of injury a claimant had an established field, skill or vocation from which
he was precluded as a consequence of the accident. Claimant did not require retraining in order
to "restore" his time-of-injury earning capacity because the accident did not leave him unable to
exploit any previously held skill or vocation.

Claimant could not be said to be in need of

retraining in some other field when the evidence failed to demonstrate an initial or established
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field in which he was no longer able to compete because of his injuries. In other words, the
statute, on its face, does not anticipate the type of educational training that is at issue here.
Claimant did not pursue a course of retraining, but he assuredly pursued a course of training by
acting upon his desire to pursue education secondary to his high school graduation. We decline
to characterize Claimant's designs upon obtaining an education as the retraining anticipated by
Idaho Code § 72-450.
Claimant's fall back position is that if Defendants cannot be required to pay retraining
benefits pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-450, they should not reap the fruits of Claimant's pursuit of
further education. Essentially, Claimant would have us evaluate his disability as though he had
done nothing to help himself following the accident.
Such cases come before us infrequently, but they do arise. Such individuals, because of
bad advice, or by dint of their own reasoning, conclude that the greater their disablement, the
greater will be their award of disability under the workers' compensation system. Although
workers' compensation, as envisioned, is intended to assist injured workers in their recovery and
return to work, there is no denying that for a small handful of workers, the Act creates a perverse
incentive for a poor outcome following a work injury; the Act pays benefits for those who are yet
disabled, notwithstanding their having reached maximum medical improvement. When these
cases arise, they are always somewhat disheartening, as they represent a failure of some sort
along the way.
On the other hand, this case represents the most hopeful outcome of a work injury. What
Claimant did is what everyone should do. Paradoxically, this means he is not as disabled as he
would otherwise have been, and will not recover an award to compensate him for disability over
and above disability caused by impairment, since he has none. This is what is supposed to
ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 4

happen, and we commend Claimant for his drive, and for getting on with his life. We appreciate
that Claimant may feel he is being penalized for doing the right thing. However, in the long run,
the course he chose will serve him much better than the modest disability award he might have
realized, had he sat on his hands and done nothing to improve his situation after reaching MMI.
Claimant's laudable perseverance does not mean, however, that Defendants must assume
financial responsibility for all that Claimant has done on his own behalf in order to take
advantage of the facts that exist as of the date of hearing.

We find no basis to measure

Claimant's disability on some date other than the date of hearing. Nor do we accept Claimant's
argument that because evaluation as of that date happens to inure to the advantage of Defendants,
they must either pay for Claimant's education or forego reliance on the facts of this case as they
have developed though the date of hearing. Nothing in the statutory scheme or case law forces
this choice on Defendants.

We are satisfied that the evidence demonstrates that the subject

accident did not materially change Claimant's designs upon pursuing education after high
school. This he did, and those facts must be taken into account when evaluating Claimant's
disability.
Claimant also argues that the Commission erred in acknowledging that Claimant suffered
disability of 25% of the whole person as a consequence of the subject accident, yet concluding
that no further award of disability was payable, since Claimant has already received payment of a
32% disability rating based on impairment. Per Claimant, the Commission's decision is at odds
with the explicit direction of the Court in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 333 P.3d
115 (2014) and, more recently, Davis v. Hammock Management, 161 Idaho 791,391 P.3d 1261
(2017). In response, Defendants point out that the Commission has addressed this precise issue
in the recent case of Dickinson v. Adams County, 2017 IIC 0007 (2017). In Dickinson, the
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Commission noted that Corgatelli recognizes that PPI and PPD are entirely different classes of
workers' compensation benefits, and that nothing in the statutory scheme recognizes that an
employer is allowed to credit the payment of a PPI rating against a subsequent obligation to pay
disability. Claimant argues that the rule of Corgatelli requires surety to pay both the 32% PPI
rating and the 25% disability award. We recognize that Corgatelli supports this proposition.
However, as we explained in Dickinson, Corgatelli cannot be reconciled with certain language
appearing in the subsequent case of Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 160 Idaho 223, 370 P.3d 738
(2016). Mayer contains the following footnote by Justice Burdick, the author of the majority
opm10n.
TPC attempts to make much of the fact that Idaho Code section 72-428 uses the
term "permanent disability" to describe awards specified under section 72-428's
"scheduled permanent impairments." This interchange of terms, TPC argues,
makes the use of the term "permanent disability" ambiguous in section 72-431.
However, the forerunner of Idaho Code section 72-428 was enacted in 1917, and
since that time the Idaho Code has always referred to a disability award, not an
impairment award. Although the term "impairment award" has crept into the
vernacular of the workmen's compensation bar, Idaho's Workmen's Compensation
Law only provides for an award of income benefits based on disability, not
impairment. Fowler v. City of Rexburg, 116 Idaho 1, 3 n. 5, 773 P.2d 269, 271 n.
5 (1988) ( "Income benefits payable under the Workmen's Compensation Law,
with the exception of retraining benefits, LC. § 72-450, are based upon disability,
either temporary or permanent, but not merely impairment."). A "permanent
impairment" as the definitions themselves make clear, is simply a component of a
"permanent disability." LC. §§ 72-422, -423. Thus, any final award made under
Idaho's Workmen's Compensation Law is properly referred to as a disability
award. Fowler, 116 Idaho at 3 n. 5, 773 P.2d at 271 n. 5 ("While in some cases
the non-medical factors will not increase the permanent disability rating over the
amount of the permanent impairment rating, the ultimate award of income
benefits is based upon the permanent disability rating, not merely the impairment
rating."); see also Woodvine v. Triangle Dairy, 106 Idaho 716, 722, 682 P.2d
1263, 1269 (1984).
Id. at FN 1. (Emphasis supplied).
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As we explained in Dickinson, once it is recognized that impairment is a component part of
disability, then the objections raised by the Corgatelli Court to the payment of PPI as a credit
against a subsequent award of disability tend to evaporate. Further, as developed in Dickinson,
while certain portions of the statutory scheme do appear to create a distinction between
impairment and disability, impairment is only payable as disability pursuant to the provisions of
Idaho Code § 72-428 and Idaho Code § 72-429. There is no separate statutory mechanism
authorizing the payment of impairment as something other than disability. We find no reason to
depart from the analysis developed in Dickinson, and conclude the Mayer represents the current
state of the law on this issue.

Of course, Davis was decided subsequent to Mayer, and as

Claimant has noted, Davis cites Corgatelli with approval on the question of whether or not PPI
can be applied as a credit against an award of disability.
A review of Davis reveals that it is less about parsmg Corgatelli, and more about
considering the application of Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist., 147 Idaho 277, 207
P.3d 1008 (2009). Davis involved the Commission's approval of a lump sum settlement which
recognized employer's right to a credit in the amount of a previously paid PPI award, to be
applied against its obligation to pay permanent partial disability calculated under Idaho Code §
72-428. Two months after the Commission's approval of the Davis lump sum, the Court issued
Corgatelli. The Davis Court noted that Corgatelli establishes that Idaho law does not endorse

the application of the payment of PPI as a credit against a subsequent disability award.
However, the issue before the Court in Davis was whether the Commission had jurisdiction to
approve a settlement which violated the Act. The answer, made clear by Wernecke, is no. While
Corgatelli was the basis for the finding that the Commission acted outside the bounds of its

jurisdiction, Corgatelli was not, itself, the subject of further discussion by the Court; the
ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 7

rationale of that decision received no further treatment or illumination, and Davis, except in
recognizing the rule of Corgatelli, leaves us no closer to understanding how Corgatelli might be
reconciled with what seems to be an entirely different point of view expressed in Mayer. For
these reasons, we do not find Davis instructive on the questions which are the subject of our
analysis in Dickinson.

It is more frequently the case that impairment, though a component of a disability award,
does not represent the full extent of Claimant's disability, once account is taken of the various
non-medical factors referenced at Idaho Code § 72-430. Here, however, Claimant's impairment
paid as disability is found to more than adequately compensate him for whatever disability he
has suffered as a consequence of the subject accident.

It would, indeed, award Claimant a

windfall to require the payment of an additional 25%, over and above the 32% disability award
that has already been paid, since that 32% rating represents impairment paid as disability, and
Claimant has failed to demonstrate that he has suffered disability in excess of his impairment.
For the foregoing reasons, we deny Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration.
DATED this

5-fn day of
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I hereby certify that on the
day of, ~ , 2018, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S MOTJONF(Ot RECONSIDERATION was
served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following:

W BRECK SEINIGER
942 MYRTLE ST
BOISE ID 83702
R DANIEL BOWEN
PO BOX 1007
BOISE, ID 83701
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Seiniger Law Offices, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Bryan Oliveros,

LC. No. 08-024772

Claimant, Appellant

NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.

Rule Steel Tanks, Inc., Employer, and Pinnacle
Risk Management, Surety,
Defendants, Respondents

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS RULE STEEL TANKS, INC., Employer,
and PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT, Surety and DAN BOWEN, their attorney, (whose
address is Dan Bowen, Bowen & Bailey, 1311 W. Jefferson, P.O. Box 1007, Boise, ID 837011007, Fax: (208) 344-9670, Email: info@bowen-bailey.com) and THE CLERK OF THE
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

ORDERS APPEALED

The above-named appellant, Bryan Oliveros, appeals against the above-named
respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from all orders entered in this case, including but
not limited to the following:
1.1

Order entered on August 25, 2017 by Thomas E Limbaugh, Chairman;

1.2

Order on Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration entered on January 5, 2018 by

Thomas E Limbaugh, Chairman.

2.

COPIES OF THE ORDERS BEING APPEALED

Please see the attached.

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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3.

RIGHT TO APPEAL

The orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to
Rule 11 (d)( 1) I.A.R.

4.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF ISSUES

a.
Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err in adopting the findings of fact
and conclusions oflaw ofreferee Brian Harper? (Order entered on August 25,
2017)

4.2
ISSUES RELATED TO THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 2017-2018
ORDERS REGARDING CLAIMANT'S ENTITLEMENT TO RETRAINING BENEFITS
a.
Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err in failing to give Idaho Code §
72-450 the liberal construction to which the Claimant is entitled? (Order entered
on August 25, 2017; Order on Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration entered on
January 5, 2018)
b.
Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err in concluding that the claimant
failed to prove that he was entitled to reimbursement and corresponding total
temporary disabilities under Idaho code section 72 - 450? (Order entered on
August 25, 2017; Order on Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration entered on
January 5, 2018)

4.3
ISSUES RELATED TO THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 2017-2018
ORDERS REGARDING CLAIMANT'S ENTITLEMENT TO PERMANENT DISABILITY
BENEFITS

a.
Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err in concluding that the claimant
failed to prove that he was entitled to permanent partial disability benefits in
excess of the 32% whole person impairment benefits previously paid? (Order
entered on August 25, 2017; Order on Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration
entered on January 5, 2018)

4.4

ISSUES RELATED TO THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS DISREGARD OF CONTROLLING IDAHO SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
REGARDING UNIMPEACHED AND UNREBUTTED TESTIMONY

a.
Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law in concluding
that it had discretion to disregard the unrebutted opinions of Claimant's
vocational expert, Douglas Crum, in contravention of the holding of Pierstorff v.
Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438,447,448, 74 P.2d 171, 175 (1937) (Pierstorff,
first tried to the Industrial Commission, remains applicable to adjudications by the
Idaho Industrial Commission, Swanson v. State, 114 Idaho 607, 609, 759 P.2d
898, 900, (1988)) and its progeny? (Order entered on August 25, 2017; Order on
Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration entered on January 5, 2018)
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b.
Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law in arbitrarily or
capriciously disregard the unrebutted opinions of Claimant's vocational expert,
Douglas Crum, which was unimpeached by any of the modes known to the law,
and did not exceed probability in contravention of the holdings in Pierstorff v.
Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438,447,448, 74 P.2d 171, 175 (1937) Jeffrey v.
Trouse, 100 Mont. 538, 50 P.2d 872, 874 [(1935)] and Gerdon v. Con Paulos,
Inc., 160 Idaho 335,343, 372 P.3d 390,398, 2016. (Order on Claimant's Motion
for Reconsideration entered on January 5, 2018; Order on Claimant's Motion for
Reconsideration entered on January 5, 2018)
c.
Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law in failing to
follow the law as laid down in Pierstorff v. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 447,
448, 74 P.2d 171, 175 (1937) and its progeny? (Order entered on August 25,
2017; Order on Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration entered on January 5,
2018)
4.5

ISSUES RELATED TO THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS DISREGARD OF CONTROLLING IDAHO SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
REGARDING THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF IDAHO CODE§ 72425 CONTROLLING IDAHO SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT CONCERNING PERMANENT
IMPAIRMENT AND PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS

a.
Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err as a matter of law in its
interpretation of Idaho Code § 72-425 and disregarding the precedent of the Idaho
Supreme Court laid down in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287,335
P.3d 1150 (2014) and reiterated the holding in Corgatelli in Davis v. Hammack
Mgmt., 161 Idaho 791,795,391 P.3d 1261, 1265, (2017) concerning deduction of
permanent impairment benefits from permanent disability benefits? (Order
entered on August 25, 2017; Order on Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration
entered on January 5, 2018)
b.
Did the Idaho Industrial Commission err in denying Claimant's Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order entered on August 25, 2017? (Order on Claimant's
Motion for Reconsideration entered on January 5, 2018)
4.6

ISSUES RELATED TO CLAIMANT/APPELLANTS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

a.
Did the violate Claimant's Constitutional rights and the Doctrine of
Separation of Powers by ignoring, and thereby effectively overruling, the Idaho
Supreme Court's decisions in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287,335
P.3d 1150 (2014) and Davis v. Hammack Mgmt., 161 Idaho 791,795,391 P.3d
1261, 1265, (2017). (Order on Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration entered on
January 5, 2018)
b.
Did the violate Claimant's Constitutional right to equal protection by
ignoring, and thereby effectively overruling, the Idaho Supreme Court's decisions
in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287,335 P.3d 1150 (2014) and Davis
NOTICE OF APPEAL
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v. Hammack Mgmt., 161 Idaho 791,795,391 P.3d 1261, 1265, (2017). (Order on
Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration entered on January 5, 2018)
5. ·

SEALING OF THE RECORD

Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No.

If so, what portion?
5.1

Is a reporter's transcript requested? No, transcripts of the hearings previously

prepared will be included in the Agency's Record as exhibits.
6.

AGENCY RECORD REQUESTED

The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Agency's Record in
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.

7.

a.

All exhibits offered during the hearing of December 7, 2011;

b.

The transcript of the hearing of February 22, 2017;

c.

All exhibits offered during the hearing of February 22, 2017;

d.

Memorandum In Support Of Claimant's Motion For Reconsideration
filed September 14, 2017;

e.

Reply Memorandum In Support Of Claimant's Motion For
Reconsideration filed October 18, 2017;

I certify:
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: Not
applicable.
(b) (1)

□

That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the

estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript.
(2) D That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee because

(c)

(1) IZI That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record has

been paid.
(2) D That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the
preparation of the record because _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(d)

(1) IZI That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
NOTICE OF APPEAL
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(2) D That appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because

(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule
20.
DATED February 15, 2018.

/s/ Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr.
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr.
SEINIGER LAW
Attorneys for the Claimant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On February 15, 2018, I served the foregoing by facsimile transmission on:
Dan Bowen
1311 W. Jefferson
P.O. Box 1007
Boise, ID 83701-1007
Fax: (208) 344-9670
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Isl Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr.
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr.
SEINIGER LAW
Attorneys for the Claimant/Appellant
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BRYAN OLIVEROS,
IC 2008-024772

Claimant,
V.

ORDER

RULE STEEL TANKS, INC.,
Employer,
and

Fl LED

ADV ANTAGE WORKERS
COMPENSATION INSURANCE CO.,

AUG 25 2017
IHOOSlRIAl~

Surety,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-717, Referee Brian Harper submitted the record in the
above-entitled matter, together with his recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law, to
the members of the Idaho Industrial Commission for their review. Each of the undersigned
Commissioners has reviewed the record and the recommendations of the Referee.
Commission concurs with these recommendations.

The

Therefore, the Commission approves,

confirms, and adopts the Referee's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as its own.
Based upon the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Claimant has failed to prove he is entitled to reimbursement and corresponding

temporary total disability benefits under Idaho Code§ 72-450.
2.

Claimant has failed to prove he is entitled to additional permanent partial

disability benefits in excess of the 32% whole person impairment benefits previously paid.

ORDER-1

3.

Claimant has failed to prove he 1s entitled to an award of attorney fees

under Idaho Code§ 72-804.
4.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to

all matters adjudicated.
DATEDthisJ..1Actayof~,2017.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

----G"f.,/

Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I hereby certify that on the tJY"day of
2017, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was served by regularU ~d States Mail upon each of the following:
W BRECK SEINIGER
942 MYRTLE STREET
BOISE ID 83702

jsk
ORDER-2

R DANIEL BOWEN
PO BOX 1007
BOISE ID 83701

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OJ;~ IDAHO

BRYAN OLIVEROS,
Claimant,

IC 2008-024772

V.

RULE STEEL TANKS, INC.,

ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Employer,
and
ADVANTAGE WORKERS
COMPENSTATION INSURANCE CO.,
Surety,
Defendants.

FILED

JAN U5 2018
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

On or about September 14, 2017, Claimant filed his timely Motion for Reconsideration of
the Commission's August 25, 2017 Order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
authored by Referee Harper. Claimant filed a contemporaneous brief in support of his motion as
required by JRP Rule 3(G). In his supporting brief, Claimant argues that the Commission erred
in declining to award Claimant disability in excess of his 32% PPI rating. First, the Commission
erroneously concluded that because Claimant had designs upon pursuing higher education even
before the work accident, there was insufficient proof that the education he pursued following
the work accident was necessitated by that accident. Further, since the vocational evidence
established that Claimant's post-accident education was responsible for significantly reducing his
disability, it was error for the Commission to decline to award Claimant reimbursement for the
expenses associated with those educational endeavors. Finally, the Commission's finding that
Claimant's post-injury education diminished his disability was inconsistent with the
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Commission's observation that since Claimant was able to work in the fast food industry both
before and after the subject accident this augured against a finding that he suffered accidentproduced disability.
The other major basis for Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration is his assertion that the
Commission erred in not granting Claimant disability in the amount of 25% of the whole person,
over and above the 32% PPI rating previously paid. Per Corgatelli v. Steel West, fnc., 157 Idaho
287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) disability and impairment are separate classes of benefits, and are
therefore separately payable.

In treating impairment as a component of disability, the

Commission denied Claimant the separate awards of impairment and disability envisioned by

Corgatelli and the subsequent case of Davis v. Hammack Management, Inc., 161 Idaho 791, 391
P.3d 1261 (2017).
Defendants responded on September 21, 2017.

Defendants argue that while the

Commission's decision that Claimant is not entitled to payments above and beyond the 32%
impairment rating previously paid as disability is potentially at odds with both Corgatelli and

Davis, it is entirely consistent with Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 160 Idaho 223, 370 P.3d 738
(2016), and the recent Commission decision Dickinson v. Adams County, 2017 ITC 0007 (2017),
discussing the conflicting holdings of Corgatelli and Mayer. As to Claimant's other arguments,
Defendants assert that the Commission did not err in recognizing that Claimant's post-accident
educational activities improved his access to the labor market; the Commission's decision does
not penalize Claimant for advancing his own interests.
Claimant filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718.
Pursuant to that section, the Commission may rehear or reconsider its decision based on the
arguments of the paiiies.

A motion for reconsideration must be properly supported by a
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recitation of the factual findings and/or legal conclusions with which the moving party takes
issue. However, the Commission is not ordinarily inclined to re-weigh evidence and arguments
simply because a case was not resolved in the moving party's favor.
In this matter, it was the principal thrust of Claimant's claim that he suffered significant
disability as a consequence of the permanent limitations / restrictions stemming from the July 30,
Claimant acknowledged that his post-accident

2008 accident involving his right hand.

educational and employment-related activities significantly improved his access to the labor
market following the accident.

He argued that Employer should be required to reimburse

Claimant for the expenses associated with his education pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-450, or,
failing that, his disability should be evaluated without taking into consideration the education he
pursued, at his own expense, following the subject accident. In other words, Employer should
not be allowed to avoid reimbursing Claimant for the expenses associated with his education
while, at the same time, enjoying the benefits of Claimant's admirable impetus to pull himself up
by his own boot straps, thus improving his employment opportunities.
The Commission first determined that Claimant did not qualify for retraining benefits
pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-450. In order to qualify for benefits under that section, it must be
demonstrated that the injured worker is "in need of retraining in another field, skill or vocation in
order to restore his earning capacity ... "

As developed in the original decision, this language

implies that at the time of injury a claimant had an established field, skill or vocation from which
he was precluded as a consequence of the accident. Claimant did not require retraining in order
to "restore" his time-of-injury earning capacity because the accident did not leave him unable to
exploit any previously held skill or vocation.

Claimant could not be said to be in need of

retraining in some other field when the evidence failed to demonstrate an initial or established
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field in which he was no longer able to compete because of his injuries. In other words, the
statute, on its face, does not anticipate the type of educational training that is at issue here.
Claimant did not pursue a course of retraining, but he assuredly pursued a course of training by
acting upon his desire to pursue education secondary to his high school graduation. We decline
to characterize Claimant's designs upon obtaining an education as the retraining anticipated by
Idaho Code § 72-450.
Claimant's fallback position is that if Defendants cannot be required to pay retraining
benefits pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-450, they should not reap the fruits of Claimant's pursuit of
further education. Essentially, Claimant would have us evaluate his disability as though he had
done nothing to help himself following the accident.
Such cases come before us infrequently, but they do arise. Such individuals, because of
bad advice, or by dint of their own reasoning, conclude that the greater their disablement, the
greater will be their award of disability under the workers' compensation system. Although
workers' compensation, as envisioned, is intended to assist injured workers in their recovery and
return to work, there is no denying that for a small handful of workers, the Act creates a perverse
incentive for a poor outcome following a work injury; the Act pays benefits for those who are yet
disabled, notwithstanding their having reached maximum medical improvement. When these
cases arise, they are always somewhat disheartening, as they represent a failure of some sort
along the way.
On the other hand, this case represents the most hopeful outcome of a work injury. What
Claimant did is what everyone should do. Paradoxically, this means he is not as disabled as he
would otherwise have been, and will not recover an award to compensate him for disability over
and above disability caused by impairment, since he has none. This is what is supposed to
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happen, and we commend Claimant for his drive, and for getting on with his life. We appreciate
that Claimant may feel he is being penalized for doing the right thing. However, in the long run,
the course he chose will serve him much better than the modest disability award he might have
realized, had he sat on his hands and done nothing to improve his situation after reaching MMI.
Claimant's laudable perseverance does not mean, however, that Defendants must assume
financial responsibility for all that Claimant has done on his own behalf in order to take
advantage of the facts that exist as of the date of hearing.

We find no basis to measure

Claimant's disability on some date other than the date of hearing. Nor do we accept Claimant's
argument that because evaluation as of that date happens to inure to the advantage of Defendants,
they must either pay for Claimant's education or forego reliance on the facts of this case as they
have developed though the date of hearing. Nothing in the statutory scheme or case law forces
this choice on Defendants.

We are satisfied that the evidence demonstrates that the subject

accident did not materially change Claimant's designs upon pursuing education after high
school. This he did, and those facts must be taken into account when evaluating Claimant's
disability.
Claimant also argues that the Commission erred in acknowledging that Claimant suffered
disability of 25% of the whole person as a consequence of the subject accident, yet concluding
that no further award of disability was payable, since Claimant has already received payment of a
32% disability rating based on impairment. Per Claimant, the Commission's decision is at odds
with the explicit direction of the Court in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 333 P.3d
l 15 (2014) and, more recently, Davis v. Hammock Management, 161 Idaho 791,391 P.3d 1261
(2017). In response, Defendants point out that the Commission has addressed this precise issue
in the recent case of Dickinson v. Adams County, 2017 IIC 0007 (2017). In Dickinson, the
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Commission noted that Corgatelli recognizes that PPI and PPD are entirely different classes of
workers' compensation benefits, and that nothing in the statutory scheme recognizes that an
employer is allowed to credit the payment of a PPI rating against a subsequent obligation to pay
disability. Claimant argues that the rule of Corgatelli requires surety to pay both the 32% PPI
rating and the 25% disability award.

We recognize that Corgatelli supports this proposition.

However, as we explained in Dickinson, Corgatelli cannot be reconciled with certain language
appearing in the subsequent case of Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 160 Idaho 223, 370 P.3d 738
(2016). Mayer contains the following footnote by Justice Burdick, the author of the majority
opm10n.
TPC attempts to make much of the fact that Idaho Code section 72-428 uses the
term "permanent disability" to describe awards specified under section 72-428's
"scheduled permanent impairments." This interchange of terms, TPC argues,
makes the use of the term "pemrnnent disability" ambiguous in section 72-431.
However, the forerunner of Idaho Code section 72-428 was enacted in 1917, and
since that time the Idaho Code has always referred to a disability award, not an
impairment award. Although the term "impairment award" has crept into the
vernacular of the workmen's compensation bar, Idaho's Workmen's Compensation
Law only provides for an award of income benefits based on disability, not
impairment. Fowler v. City of Rexburg, 116 Idaho 1, 3 n. 5, 773 P.2d 269, 271 n.
5 (1988) ( "Income benefits payable under the Workmen's Compensation Law,
with the exception of retraining benefits, I.C. § 72-450, are based upon disability,
either temporary or permanent, but not merely impairment."). ~ermanent
impairment" as the definitions themselves make clear, is simply a component of a
"permanent disability." I.C. §§ 72-422, -423. Thus. any final award made under
Idaho's Workmen's Compensation Law is properly refen-ed to as a disability
award. Fowler, 116 Idaho at 3 n. 5, 773 P.2d at 271 n. 5 ("While in some cases
the non-medical factors will not increase the permanent disability rating over the
amount of the permanent impairment rating, the ultimate award of income
benefits is based upon the permanent disability rating, not merely the impairment
rating."); see also Woodvine v. Triangle Dairy, 106 Idaho 716, 722, 682 P.2d
1263, 1269 (1984).
Id at FN 1. (Emphasis supplied).
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As we explained in Dickinson, once it is recognized that impairment is a component part of
disability, then the o~jections raised by the Corgatelli Court to the payment of PPI as a credit
against a subsequent award of disability tend to evaporate. Further, as developed in Dickinson,
while certain portions of the statutory scheme do appear to create a distinction between
impainnent and disability, impairment is only payable as disability pursuant to the provisions of
Idaho Code § 72-428 and Idaho Code § 72-429.

There is no separate statutory mechanism

authorizing the payment of impairment as something other than disability. We find no reason to
depart from the analysis developed in Dickinson, and conclude the Mayer represents the current
state of the law on this issue.

Of course, Davis was decided subsequent to Mayer, and as

Claimant has noted, Davis cites Corgatelli with approval on the question of whether or not PPI
can be applied as a credit against an award of disability.
A review of Davis reveals that it is less about parsmg Corgatelli, and more about
considering the application of Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist., 147 Idaho 277, 207
P.3d 1008 (2009). Davis involved the Commission's approval of a Jump sum settlement which
recognized employer's right to a credit in the amount of a previously paid PPI award, to be
applied against its obligation to pay permanent partial disability calculated under Idaho Code §
72-428. Two months after the Commission's approval of the Davis lump sum, the Comi issued
Corgatelli. The Davis Court noted that Corgatelli establishes that Idaho law does not endorse
the application of the payment of PPI as a credit against a subsequent disability award.
However, the issue before the Court in Davis was whether the Commission had jurisdiction to
approve a settlement which violated the Act. The answer, made clear by Wernecke, is no. While
Corgatelli was the basis for the finding that the Commission acted outside the bounds of its
jurisdiction, Corgatelli was not, itself, the subject of further discussion by the Comi; the·

ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 7

,1

!' .

rationale of that decision received no further treatment or illumination, and Davis, except in
recognizing the rule of Corgatelli, leaves us no closer to understanding how Corgatelli might be
reconciled with what seems to be an entirely different point of view expressed in Mayer. For
these reasons, we do not find Davis instructive on the questions which are the subject of our
analysis in Dickinson.

It is more frequently the case that impairment, though a component of a disability award,
does not represent the full extent of Claimant's disability, once account is taken of the various
non-medical factors referenced at Idaho Code § 72-430. Here, however, Claimant's impairment
paid as disability is found to more than adequately compensate him for whatever disability he
has suffered as a consequence of the subject accident.

It would, indeed, award Claimant a

windfall to require the payment of an additional 25%, over and above the 32% disability award
that has already been paid, since that 32% rating represents impairment paid as disability, and
Claimant has failed to demonstrate that he has suffered disability in excess of his impairment.
For the foregoing reasons, we deny Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration.
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